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31
Suntrust Mortgage Scandal / Re: Suntrust Mortgage Scandal
« Last post by Jimmy Taylor on March 12, 2018, 12:44:51 AM »
Suntrust bought my mortgage, so I only have experience with P&I payments and paying off the loan--I can't review their underwriters, etc. I did not use them for escrow, so I can't comment on their handling of that, either. I aggressively paid down my loan for the last year, sending them large payments with a few months over $10k. They received those payments as a direct payment from my checking account just fine. But on the final month, they rejected my payment and sent no notice to me. I called them inquiring about it because I didn't see my balance go to zero. I was told that they had received my final payment, congratulated me on paying it off, and it should take a day or two to post. It didn't post.

Instead, they have a policy that any payoff amount greater than $5k would only be accepted if it was done by wire. They blamed the reason for that on "costs to close the account." If that were true, then they wouldn't require it for final payments less than $5k. And it wasn't a problem for my earlier large payments--they accepted and cashed those just fine. If I had instead paid (as usual) all but $1 and then paid (as usual) a final payment of $1, everything would have been fine and I wouldn't have needed to buy a wire.

In the end, I had to pay a bit more interest, which isn't really a big deal. They couldn't confirm when they could receive a wire, so I had to pay more and then wait two weeks for the extra to be refunded. Also, that doesn't really bother me too much. Once they got the wire, they took care of everything, sent me my refund, etc., properly. However, the simple practice of discouraging people from paying off their loan, making it difficult to do so, not informing me of rejection of my payment, having employees who don't know the rule, and then told me bad information that my payment had been received IS a problem.

Another problem is their online security. I had an online account with password which they decided wasn't good enough. I don't care for companies going to stupid lengths for passwords because when they are hacked it's not because people didn't use special characters, capitals, greek letters, or emojis. It's because the company's system is breached and individuals' passwords are stolen. Also, their 'security' questions were entirely made up things I couldn't answer or the answer might change over time. How am I supposed to remember what my favorite food was decades after signing up for an account? What it tells me is they don't actually care about real security or user experience. They were given some generic advice & probably a bad list of security questions and rolled it out without even reviewing or testing it. In the end, I don't like them or trust them. I will not do business with them again.
32
Suntrust Mortgage Scandal / Fake Loans and Lost Notes - SunTrust Scandal
« Last post by citizensscience on March 11, 2018, 08:45:08 PM »
SunTrust Scandal


Fake Loans, Lost Notes and SunTrust Mortgage -

SunTrust will not fund a loan where the original wet ink note isn't present, so why then, does SunTrust not have any of these Orginial Notes?

Did SunTrust loose the notes after they bought them or after they double-pledged the notes? 

Wells Fargo purchased these worthless Fake Loans from SunTrust, later discovering the underlying documents (assets) do not exist.   

Click here - https://vimeo.com/citizensscience/mortgagemill


33
#SunTrust Scandal, Jerome Lienhard, SunTrust Mortgage, SunTrust Bank





Jerome Lienhard was named chief risk officer of SunTrust Banks, Inc., effective November 1, 2015. In this role, he is responsible for the company’s risk discipline including market, operational, credit and compliance risk and oversees the risk review assurance function, and portfolio risk analytics and modeling.   

Prior to being named to this position, Lienhard served as president and chief executive officer of SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. Lienhard joined SunTrust Bank in 2006 as senior vice president and treasurer responsible for funding, treasury operations, portfolio management and asset liability management. Prior to joining SunTrust, he was senior vice president and treasurer for Freddie Mac. He joined Freddie Mac after an eighteen-year career with Toyota, his last role being corporate treasury manager for Toyota Motor Credit Corporation.

Lienhard earned a bachelor’s degree in Accounting and a master’s degree in International Finance from the University of Southern California. He currently chairs Housing Policy of the Financial Services Roundtable. He is a a board member of the Virginia Council of Economic Education and a Trustee of Virginia Union University.


(Below) SunTrust get caught yet again in its “Fake Loan” Scheme, inventing documents that did not exist nor were the documents SunTrust speaks to present at the closing table…. This is why its so important to know who you are paying and if they have the “Right to Collect".  SunTrust does not own this loan, they know this and we thought we would let a few others know this too.  Meaning the borrower cannot pay off their loan.  No one at this point really knows who has the “Right to Collect” and SunTrust is for some reason trying to mask who the real “Noteholder" is.  Were not giving in, so stay tuned and see the latest below.


Date: March 11, 2018 at 2:04:25 PM EDT
To: Jerome Lienhard <jerome.lienhard@suntrust.com>, jadams@mcguirewoods.com, abrackett@mcguirewoods.com, rcullen@mcguirewoods.com, joe.smith@mortgageoversight.com, Mark Chancy <Mark.Chancy@SunTrust.com>, Ben Barco <Ben.Barco@brockandscott.com>, jim.bonner@brockandscott.com, greg.scott@brockandscott.com, Elizabeth Stone <ecstone@williamsmullen.com>

Cc: bill.rogers@suntrust.com, jorge.arrieta@suntrust.com, margaret.callihan@suntrust.com, anil.cheriyan@suntrust.com, aleem.gillani@suntrust.com, susan.johnson@suntrust.com, ellen.fitzsimmons@suntrust.com, dorinda.smith@suntrust.com, jackie.ballos@suntrust.com, dave.vanaken@suntrust.com


Subject: Little Bo-Peep and... SunTrust Mortgage...

Mr. Lienhard -

First, let me congratulate the Virginia Cavaliers for a great win over the Heels yesterday. 

As this relates to us... Now and again it's good to rejoice in unity... 

It's even more meaningful when it's between us... Two opposing parties, the Trustee SunTrust Appointed, and best yet SunTrust’s own expert witness, who had “personal knowledge”. 

It's not often when the Attorney for Substitute Trustee, and SunTrust Mortgage own Operations Manager all agree with the SunTrust Attorney and defendants counsel, whereas stating the Note is in fact, not lost, nor has it ever been...

Kinda started off sounding a little bit like “Little Bo-Peep”…  didn’t it…

Hey, but in all seriousness... 

Mr. Lienhard - Wells Fargo is trying to get-up with you over this…  Among others… In fact, another big bank may be looking to connect with you too…

While your trying to figure out what just happened, and how all of us agree so easily, I've been trying to tell you I'm easy going and one who strives for consensus, I don't know?  Perhaps ur just hard headed?

At this point it has nothing to do with me, or this file.  Rather everything to do with:

- MBS's, PSA's, MLPA's, Article 9, SPV's, Securitization, Delivery, REMIC, Entity Level Tax Exemption, SFAS Rules, GAAP, Pierced and "Not-So" Bankruptcy Remote... 

Let's not forget @ the Federal Home Loan Bank... You know...

SunTrust has some real problems... Are you planning on disclosing to your shareholders all those 2011 NC Mortgages that appear to be of no effect, you know it's in the $100's of millions... 

Or are you just going to wait on the next HAMP program so you can falsely claim federal modification credits to "Re-Connect Lost Lien-holds"?

SunTrust has a real credibility problem -

Now, all of us agreeing on the Note, now that's special... Not to mention it's SunTrust contracted Attorney & Trustee firm that underscored it.

As if all that wasn't enough, you need to let me know how ur gonna handle your Double Pledged / ARM Rate Change Scheme as it relates here... 

You sure have a lot to get to krack'in on...




34
Suntrust Mortgage Scandal / Who’s you “Noteholder”?
« Last post by citizensscience on March 11, 2018, 07:10:49 AM »
SunTrust Mortgage Scandal


For those just joining this unbelievable story, one where two banks Wells Fargo and SunTrust seem to be fighting it out over who has the 1) Right to Collect and 2) Right to Enforce… 

Here’s an internal email from Wells Fargo instructing its employees on what NOT to say when the borrower calls to inquire…

All the borrower wanted to know is who had the right to collect (payoff) on their loan… 

Who are you paying, do they have the right to collect on your loan?  Current borrowers want to know…

35
Wells Fargo “Rats-Out" SunTrust in "Fake Loan" Scheme...

Holder, Owner, Investor, Lender or “Noteholder”…

How long has SunTrust Mortgage had you snowed, collecting on a Fake Loan they do not own??

Below is an amazing set of events best described as a metamorphosis… One that effects the two founding elements of a promissory note…

1) The Right to “Collect”

2) The Right to "Enforce"

Keep in mind, this is all relating to the same Fake Loan number that SunTrust has been collecting on for years…  SunTrust doesn’t know what rights they have under the Note… That is until Wells Fargo appears to yank an knot in SunTrust Mortgage, who is Wells Fargo’s Loan Servicing Sub-SubContractor.  With quite the checkered past we might add…

- SunTrust Mortgage acting as the "Servicer" States the "NoteHolder" is SunTrust Bank.

- Next SunTrust Mortgage as the Servicer, states it’s the Owner / Investor in the “Same” said loan.

-  Wells Fargo then, calls out SunTrust giving rise to the rights to collect and enforce may lie within a RMBS Trust that’s controlled by Wells Fargo and NOT SunTrust.

- SunTrust Mortgage "Backs-Off" its prior statements by inserting specific language - "For Information Purposes" SunTrust Mortgage is the Owner / Investor of said loan.

- Wells Fargo sends another letter saying in summary...  Wells Fargo as likely the Master Servicer over its Loan Level Servicing “Sub-Contractor” SunTrust Mortgage and we are investigating why SunTrust Mortgage continues to pursue and collect on loans they do not own….

And this Borrower just wants to know who to pay?

Who’s your Noteholder?  Do you have a SunTrust Loan?  Are your paying the party that has the “Right to Collect” or just anyone at SunTrust that sends you a statement?

 








36
Suntrust Mortgage Scandal / Suntrust Mortgage Scandal
« Last post by citizensscience on March 10, 2018, 05:49:07 PM »
#SunTrust Scandal

37
Suntrust Mortgage Scandal / Bogus Loans -
« Last post by citizensscience on March 10, 2018, 11:28:57 AM »

Why are we focusing so much on what occurred 2007, 2008 and 2009… Because its actions taken by SunTrust Banks Inc. and its Subsidiaries that may ultimately have yet to play out…. Just stay with us, this is a bit of a deep dive perhaps for some, however it speaks to a supercharged investment vehicle that was set to fail from day one, leveraged in many cases by assets that did not exist.


Date   2010-05-05 03:29:54
From   robert.reinfrank@stratfor.com
To   marko.papic@stratfor.com, kevin.stech@stratfor.com

Re: it would be great...

Bayless advised that I temper my comments -- I did.

Kevin Stech wrote:
i was not able to comment this week

On 5/4/10 20:08, Marko Papic wrote:
to see your comments to G's weekly, if I may.
It's just my curiosity... but I also want to be educated by it.
--
Marko Papic

STRATFOR Analyst
C: + 1-512-905-3091
marko.papic@stratfor.com

--
Kevin Stech
Research Director | STRATFOR
kevin.stech@stratfor.com
+1 (512) 744-4086


Jen Richmond in red
Bayless in blue
Reinfrank in purple

Who is Stratfor? https://www.stratfor.com/about-stratfor

Since the trigger for what sparked this weekly is almost certainly the Goldman investigation, I do think addressing it in the very beginning would be an excellent primer before diving into a discussion of the 50,000 foot view of economic vs. political crises and the Wealth of Nations

The Global Crisis of Legitimacy

Financial panics are an integral part of capitalism.  So are economic recessions.  The system generates them and it becomes stronger because of them.  Like forest fires, they are painful when they occur, yet without them, the forest couldn’t survive.  They impose discipline, punishing the reckless, rewarding the cautious. They do so imperfectly of course, at times the reckless are rewarded and the cautious are penalized.  Political crises – as opposed to normal financial panics -- emerge when the reckless appear the beneficiaries of the crisis they have or have not caused, while the rest of society bears the burdens of their recklessness.

At that point, the crisis ceases to be financial or economic. It becomes political. [I understand the rhetorical point you’re trying to make, but the question is still very much economic -- just because politicians will be the ones answering it doesn’t make it a political question.] The finance and economics are subsystems of a broader political system.  A more precise way to think about this is to think of nations as consisting of three basic systems: political, economic and military.  Each of these systems have elites that manage those systems, and the three systems are constantly interacting and, in a healthy polity, balancing each other, compensating for failures in one, taking advantage of success. Every nation has a different configuration within these systems and between them.  The relative weight each system has differs, as do the importance of their elites.  But each nation contains these systems, and each has elites overseeing it. None exists without the other.

Consider the capitalist economic system.  Its foundation in modernity is the concept of the corporation [the foundation of capitalism is the market-based economy driven by supply and demand. A LLC is a consequence of political/legal influence in modern capitalism]. The corporation is built around the idea of limited liability for investors, the notion that if you buy part or all of a company, you yourself are not liable for its debts or the harm that it might do.  Your risk is limited to your investment.  In other words, you may own all or part of a company, but you are not responsible for what it does beyond your investment.

This extraordinary idea is the foundation of modern capitalism and it is fairly unique. Well then is this the foundation for all economies?  Certainly the most important ones, but while China may be an open market, it is hardly capitalist with a closed capital account.  This analysis could benefit from examples, it is very ethereal. It is also a political invention and not an economic one.  The decision to create corporations that limit liability flows from political decisions that are implemented through the legal subsystem of politics. This is the foundation of the modern marketplace, but it is an entirely political contrivance.  A more natural organization of the marketplace is that the owners are entirely responsible for the debts and liabilities of the entity they own.  That of course would create excessive risk, suppressing economic activity.  So the political system has, over time, reallocated risk away from the owners of companies, to its creditors and customers, by allowing corporations to become bankrupt, without that bankruptcy pulling in its owners.

The precise distribution of risk within an economic system is a political matter expressed through the law. It differs from nation to nation and over time. But contrary to the idea that there is a tension between the political and economic system, the modern economic system is unthinkable except for the eccentric but indispensible political-legal contrivance of the limited liability corporation. In the precise and complex allocation of risk and immunity, we find the origins of the modern market. This is why, among other reasons that the classical economists never spoke of “economics” but always of “political economy.”

The state creates the corporation it isn’t that the state creates the corporation, but rather that it establishes the conditions in which the corporation is able to arise, defines the structure of risk and liabilities, and assures that the laws are enforced. Emerging out of this complexity—and justifying it—is “moral” [normative] regime. Protection from liability comes with a burden—that poor decisions are penalized by losses, and prudent decisions are rewarded by greater wealth and that because of this, society as a whole will benefit.  The entire scheme is designed to increase, in Adam Smith’s words “The Wealth of Nations,” by limiting liability, increasing a willingness to take risk, and imposing penalties for poor judgment and rewards for wise judgment.  But the measure of the system is not whether individuals benefit, but whether in benefiting they enhance the wealth of the nation.

Systemic risk, therefore, is not an economic concept but a political one [this is contrary to what you’ve said above, namely that the three systems coexist and interact with each other]. Systemic risk emerges when it appears that the political and legal protections given to economic actors, and particular to members of the economic elite, have been used to subvert the intent of the system. In other words, the crisis occurs when it appears that the economic elite used the laws allocation of risk, to enrich themselves in ways that undermined the wealth of the nation. Put another way, the crisis occurs when it appears that the politico-legal structure was utilized by the financial elite to enrich themselves through systematically imprudent behavior, while those engaged in prudent behavior were harmed—and that the political elite took no action to protect the victims.  Examples? [This paragraph could very well be one sentence]

In the modern public corporation, the shareholders rarely control management. A Board of Directors technically oversees management on behalf of the shareholders.  In the recent crisis we saw behavior which devastated shareholder value, while appearing to enrich the management—the employees of the corporation.  In this case, the protections given shareholders of corporations were turned against them, when they were forced to pay for the imprudence of their employees, the managers, whose interests did not align with their employees this sentence is confusing; I’m assuming that the second use of “employees” is actually referring to shareholders.  They profited personally—through their compensation system—for actions that were inimical to the shareholders. [On the contrary, what was “dangerous” for the shareholders was that – in select cases – the compensation schemes motivated maximizing short-term shareholder value because their compensation was linked to it. The leverage, the short-term wholesale funding and the unsustainable business models employed to maximize the shareholder value eventually FAILED, which only then hurt shareholder’s value. This problem is so much more complex than as depicted here. EVEN IF you had taken a prudent approach to RMBS back in 2006 because you didn’t understand them and thought they were shady, the shareholders would have had you drawn-and-quartered as your company lost market share and underperformed – you couldn’t have done the “right” thing even if you wanted too.  Now all the shareholders are whining about how they got fleeced? Bernie Madoff is the best example – his investors didn’t want to know, where was the due diligence there? They didn’t give a $h!+ so long as their stable 10% per annum returns were rolling in. You make it sound like a few bankers’ compensation schemes brought the financial world to its knees – that is not only incredibly reductive, but far from the truth]

This is a political, not an economic crisis for two reasons. First, its because it qualitatively moves beyond the boundaries of a cyclical event. Second, because it is rooted in the political-legal definitions of the distribution of corporate risk, and the legally defined relations between management and shareholder.  In leaving the shareholder liable for actions by management, but without giving shareholders controls to limit managerial risk taking, the problem doesn’t lie with the market, but with the political system that invented and presides over the limited liability corporation. [What has happened in that the private sector risks have been transferred to the public’s balance sheet, and now the big question in how the world’s governments plan to unwind their balance sheets in an orderly way that won’t derail economic recovery, and that is the political question (that will answer an economic question).]

Financial panics that appear natural and harm the financial elite do not necessarily create political crises.  Financial panics that appear to be the result of deliberate manipulation of the allocations of risk under the law, and in which the financial elite as a whole appears to have profited from even while their shareholders and the public were harmed, inevitably creates political crises.  In the case of 2008 and the events that followed, we have a paradox.  The 2008 crisis was not unprecedented, nor was the federal bailout. We saw similar things in the municipal bond crisis of the 1970s, and the Third World Debt Crisis and Savings and Loan Crisis in the 1980s. Nor was the recession that followed behave oddly anomalous.  It was seven years after the previous one and compared to the 1970s and early 1980s, when unemployment was over ten percent, along with inflation and mortgages were at over 20 percent, this was painful but well within the bounds of expected behavior.

The crisis was rooted in the appearance that the crisis was triggered by the behavior, not of small town banks or third world countries, but in the global financial elite, who took advantage of the complexities of law to enrich themselves instead of the shareholders and clients to whom it was thought they had prior fiduciary responsibility.

This is a political crisis, not an economic one [False]. The political elite is responsible for the corporate elite in a unique fashion: the corporation was a political invention, and its behavior, by definition, depends on the political system. But on a deeper sense, the crisis is one of both political and corporate elites, and the perception that by omission or commission, they acted together, knowingly engineering the outcome that happened.  In a sense, it doesn’t matter whether this is what happened.  The fact that it is widely believed that this is what happened is the crisis.  You are making the crisis sound so homogeneous.  Can it really be broken down so neatly into a package that fits all polities/economies? So far I’ve basically been reading this as being focused on the US political/corporate elite and their actions.. if it’s meant to cover the scope of the globe, then that should be made more clear. Agree with Jen. [Seems very convenient the fact of the matter doesn’t actually matter.]

The public expects elites to benefit themselves.  The public is cynical about such things.  But at the same time there is a limit to the behavior that they will tolerate, and that might be defined, with Adam Smith, as the point in which the wealth of the nation itself is endangered—where the system is generating outcomes that harm the nation.  In extreme form, these crises can delegitimize regimes.  In the extreme form—and we are nowhere near that I know this is addressed in the following para, but I’m left unclear about what countries exactly you’re talking about in this specific example —this is where the military elite steps in to take control of the system.

This is not something that is confined to the United States by any means, although part of this analysis is designed to explain why the Obama Administration must go after Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and others. The symbol of Goldman Sachs profiting from actions that devastate wc the national wealth, or of the management of Lehman wiping out shareholder value while they themselves did well, creates a crisis of confidence in the political as well as the financial system.  With the crisis of legitimacy not settling down after nearly two years, the reaction of the political system is predictable.  It will both anoint symbolic miscreants, and redefine the structure of risk and liability in financial corporations.  The goal is not so much to achieve something as to create the impression that it’s achieving something, in other words, to demonstrate that the political system is prepared to control the entities it created.

We see a similar crisis in Europe.  The financial institutions in Europe were fully complicit in the global financial crisis.  They bought and sold derivatives whose value they knew to be other than stated, the same as Americans.  The European  financial institutions have asserted that they were the hapless victims of unscrupulous American firms. But the Europeans were as sophisticated as their American counterparts. Their elite knew what they were doing. [I haven’t seen you mention the RATING AGENCIES who rubber-stamped all this corporate RMBS paper as “AAA”, which allowed all these subprime mortgages to be bundled, tranched, securitized and sold all over the world. Where’s the discussion of too big to fail? FNM and FDM not too big to fail? The fact that they’re always there to buy these bogus mortgages doesn’t motivate people to game that system? The government didn’t motivate bankers to originate/distribute subprime credit to boost home ownership for select groups? Financial systems are not naturally prone to boom and bust?]

Complicating the European position was the creation of the Economic Union and the Euro by the economic and political elite.  There has always been a great deal of ambiguity concerning the powers and authority of the EU, but its intentions were always clear: to harmonize Europe and to create European wide solutions to economic problems.  This was a goal that always created unease in Europe. First, there were those who were concerned that a united Europe would exist to benefit the elites, rather than the broader public.  There were also those who believed that it was designed to benefit the Franco-German core of Europe rather than Europe as a whole. This was, on the whole, minority sentiment, but it was a substantial minority.

The financial crisis came at Europe in three phases. The first was part of the American subprime crisis.  The second, wave was a unique European crisis. European banks had taken massive positions in the Eastern European banking systems. The Czech system was almost entirely foreign (Austria and Italy) owned.  These banks began lending to Eastern European home buyers, with mortgages denominated in Euros, Swiss Franc or Yen, rather than in the currencies of the countries involved, none yet included in the Eurozone.  By doing this the banks were able to reduce interest rates, as the risk of currency fluctuation was pushed over to the borrower.  When the Zlotys and Forints began to plunge, the monthly mortgage payments began to soar, as did defaults.  The European core, led by Germany, refused a European bailout of the borrowers or lenders, in spite of the fact that the lenders who created this crisis were in Eurozone countries. Instead the IMF was called in to use money that included American and Chinese, as well as European, to solve the problem.  This raised the question in Eastern Europe as to what it meant to be part of the EU.

The third wave is represented by crisis in sovereign debt in countries that are part of the Eurozone but not in the core of Europe—Greece of course, but also Portugal and possibly Spain.  In the Greek case, the Germans in particularly hesitated in intervening in Greece, until it could draw the IMF—and non-European money and guarantees—into the mix.  This obviously raised questions in the periphery about what membership in the Eurozone meant, just as it created questions in Eastern Europe about what membership in the EU meant.

But the a much deeper crisis of legitimacy arose.  In Germany, elite sentiment accepted that some sort of intervention in Greece was inevitable.  Public sentiment opposed it overwhelmingly.  The political elite moved into tension with the financial elite, under public pressure.  In Greece, there was a similar crisis between an elite that accepted that foreign discipline would have to be introduced, and a public who saw this discipline as a betrayal of their interest and national sovereignty.

In Europe you have a double crisis.  As in the United States there is a crisis between the financial and political systems. This is not as intense as in the United States because of a deeper tradition of integration between the two.  But the tension between mass and elite is every bit as intense.  The second part of the crisis is the crisis of the European Union, and a growing sense that the European Union is the problem and not the solution.  As in the United States, there is a growing movement to distrust, not only of national arrangements, but of multi-national arrangements as well.

The United States and Europe are far from the only areas of the world where there are crises of legitimacy.  In China, for example, the growing suppression of all dissent derives from serious questions as to whom the financial expansion of the past thirty years benefits, and who will pay for the downturns.  It is also interesting to note that Russia suffers from this crisis much less than others, having lived through its crisis before. The global crisis of legitimacy has many aspects worth considering at some point.

But for now the important thing is to understand that both Europe and the United States are facing fundamental challenges to the legitimacy of, if not the regime, at least the manner in which the regime has handled itself.  The geopolitical significance of this crisis is obvious. If the Americans and Europeans both enter a period in which managing the internal balance becomes more pressing than managing the global balance, then other powers will have enhanced windows of opportunities to redefine their regional balances. May be obvious, but still a very good point, would consider stating this earlier as well

In the United States we see a predictable process.   With the unease over the elites intensifying, the political elite is trying to stabilize the situation by attacking the financial elite.  It is doing this to both demonstrate that the political elite is distinct from the financial, and to impose the “moral” [normative] consequences on the financial elite that the impersonal system was unable to do.  There is precedent for this and it will likely achieve its desired end: greater control over the financial system by the state, and an acceptable more tale ? for the public.

It is the European process that this process is much more unclear. The lack of clarity comes from the fact that this is a test for the European Union.  This is not simply a crisis within national elites, but within the multinational elite that created the EU.  If this leads to the deligitimation of the EU, then we are on in uncharted territory.

But the most important point is that almost two years since what was a normal financial panic, the polity has still not manage to absorb the consequences of that event.  The politically contrived corporation, and particularly the financial corporations, stand accused of undermining the wealth of nations.  As Adam Smith understood, markets were not natural entities but the result of political decisions, and it is the political system that creates the allocation of risk that allows markets to function.  When that system appears to fail, the consequences go far beyond the particular financials of that event. They have political consequences and in due course, geopolitical consequences.

I found the argument a bit hard to follow.  The theoretical intro could be cut down to focus on examples to make the argument.

38
Suntrust Mortgage Scandal / SunTrust Mortgage and FAKE LOANS…
« Last post by citizensscience on March 10, 2018, 10:32:25 AM »
To understand how SunTrust contributed to the historic meltdown you first have to see where these exotic Mortgage Backed Securities came from. 

For those just joining us, its when SunTrust Mortgage originates a new loan either by its full-time mortgage staff or its network of sub-contacted / affiliated Correspondent Lenders.  Whereas, SunTrust along with other related parties are to insert your “Wet-Ink” loan closing documents into a large “Black-Box” (Trust) to then have the systems corrupt rating firms apply a bogus rating based on the quality of assets and your credit.

The problem is, none of the Wet-Ink documents ever made it inside the blackbox…. This quite problematic when SunTrust Mortgage is sending its borrowers letters claiming SunTrust is the “Note-Holder” therefor would have the 1) Right to Collect and 2) Right to Enforce. 

How could SunTrust be the Note-Holder unless they are somehow inside the blackbox holding the note?

Did SunTrust “Pledge” FAKE LOANS as “Collateral” to the Federal Home Loan Bank in exchange for $10,000,000,000.00 (Billion) in Federal Reserve TAF funding window.

Its a nice way of renaming the Federal Discount Window to provide cover for SunTrusts bleak balance sheet.


U.S. Agency MBS Outstanding   

USD Millions

                                    
      FNMA      FHLMC      GNMA         Total         
Y   Q   1-4 Family   Multi   1-4 Family   Multi   1-4 Family   Multi      1-4 Family   Multi      TOTAL
1972   Q4   0.0   0.0   331.0   110.0   5,353.0   151.0      5,684.0   261.0      5,945.0
1973   Q4   0.0   0.0   617.0   149.0   7,561.0   329.0      8,178.0   478.0      8,656.0
1974   Q4   0.0   0.0   608.0   149.0   11,249.0   520.0      11,857.0   669.0      12,526.0
1975   Q4   0.0   0.0   1,349.0   249.0   17,538.0   719.0      18,887.0   968.0      19,855.0
1976   Q1   0.0   0.0   1,698.0   301.0   19,693.0   786.0      21,391.0   1,087.0      22,478.0
   Q2   0.0   0.0   1,831.0   322.0   22,821.0   813.0      24,652.0   1,135.0      25,787.0
   Q3   0.0   0.0   2,141.0   365.0   25,841.0   884.0      27,982.0   1,249.0      29,231.0
   Q4   0.0   0.0   2,282.0   389.0   29,583.0   989.0      31,865.0   1,378.0      33,243.0
1977   Q1   0.0   0.0   3,112.0   458.0   33,190.0   1,070.0      36,302.0   1,528.0      37,830.0
   Q2   0.0   0.0   3,938.0   522.0   35,467.0   1,106.0      39,405.0   1,628.0      41,033.0
   Q3   0.0   0.0   4,642.0   690.0   39,865.0   1,224.0      44,507.0   1,914.0      46,421.0
   Q4   0.0   0.0   5,621.0   989.0   43,555.0   1,341.0      49,176.0   2,330.0      51,506.0
1978   Q1   0.0   0.0   6,286.0   1,185.0   44,906.0   1,451.0      51,192.0   2,636.0      53,828.0
   Q2   0.0   0.0   7,797.0   1,626.0   46,515.0   1,517.0      54,312.0   3,143.0      57,455.0
   Q3   0.0   0.0   8,616.0   1,895.0   49,276.0   1,568.0      57,892.0   3,463.0      61,355.0
   Q4   0.0   0.0   9,657.0   2,235.0   52,732.0   1,615.0      62,389.0   3,850.0      66,239.0
1979   Q1   0.0   0.0   10,088.0   2,379.0   56,269.0   1,686.0      66,357.0   4,065.0      70,422.0
   Q2   0.0   0.0   11,096.0   2,612.0   61,246.0   1,754.0      72,342.0   4,366.0      76,708.0
   Q3   0.0   0.0   11,568.0   2,853.0   67,535.0   1,822.0      79,103.0   4,675.0      83,778.0
   Q4   0.0   0.0   12,149.0   3,031.0   73,853.0   1,934.0      86,002.0   4,965.0      90,967.0
1980   Q1   0.0   0.0   12,359.0   3,095.0   78,872.0   1,971.0      91,231.0   5,066.0      96,297.0
   Q2   0.0   0.0   12,886.0   3,234.0   82,208.0   2,074.0      95,094.0   5,308.0      100,402.0
   Q3   0.0   0.0   13,318.0   3,341.0   87,276.0   2,176.0      100,594.0   5,517.0      106,111.0
   Q4   0.0   0.0   13,471.0   3,383.0   91,602.0   2,272.0      105,073.0   5,655.0      110,728.0
1981   Q1   0.0   0.0   13,641.0   3,426.0   94,810.0   2,374.0      108,451.0   5,800.0      114,251.0
   Q2   0.0   0.0   14,115.0   3,450.0   98,057.0   2,501.0      112,172.0   5,951.0      118,123.0
   Q3   0.0   0.0   14,401.0   3,535.0   101,068.0   2,682.0      115,469.0   6,217.0      121,686.0
   Q4   717.0   0.0   19,501.0   352.0   103,007.0   2,783.0      123,225.0   3,135.0      126,360.0
1982   Q1   2,786.0   0.0   23,610.0   360.0   105,701.0   2,891.0      132,097.0   3,251.0      135,348.0
   Q2   4,556.0   0.0   28,329.0   374.0   108,487.0   2,972.0      141,372.0   3,346.0      144,718.0
   Q3   8,133.0   0.0   34,739.0   393.0   111,728.0   3,048.0      154,600.0   3,441.0      158,041.0
   Q4   14,450.0   0.0   42,560.0   404.0   116,038.0   2,902.0      173,048.0   3,306.0      176,354.0
1983   Q1   18,157.0   0.0   47,575.0   433.0   124,482.0   3,457.0      190,214.0   3,890.0      194,104.0
   Q2   20,933.0   0.0   50,446.0   488.0   135,628.0   3,648.0      207,007.0   4,136.0      211,143.0
   Q3   23,819.0   0.0   53,539.0   613.0   147,761.0   3,836.0      225,119.0   4,449.0      229,568.0
   Q4   25,121.0   0.0   57,273.0   622.0   155,950.0   3,900.0      238,344.0   4,522.0      242,866.0
1984   Q1   28,354.0   0.0   58,776.0   600.0   161,943.0   4,318.0      249,073.0   4,918.0      253,991.0
   Q2   29,256.0   0.0   60,636.0   631.0   166,723.0   4,170.0      256,615.0   4,801.0      261,416.0
   Q3   32,730.0   158.0   63,352.0   612.0   171,481.0   4,289.0      267,563.0   5,059.0      272,622.0
   Q4   35,965.0   250.0   70,253.0   569.0   175,589.0   4,392.0      281,807.0   5,211.0      287,018.0
1985   Q1   38,772.0   598.0   75,781.0   978.0   181,419.0   4,535.0      295,972.0   6,111.0      302,083.0
   Q2   41,985.0   770.0   82,369.0   958.0   188,225.0   4,697.0      312,579.0   6,425.0      319,004.0
   Q3   47,857.0   912.0   90,997.0   918.0   196,198.0   4,828.0      335,052.0   6,658.0      341,710.0
   Q4   54,036.0   951.0   99,515.0   872.0   207,198.0   4,947.0      360,749.0   6,770.0      367,519.0
1986   Q1   31,117.0   1,193.0   108,020.0   2,317.0   215,148.0   5,200.0      354,285.0   8,710.0      362,995.0
   Q2   71,153.0   1,224.0   123,676.0   2,277.0   223,838.0   5,366.0      418,667.0   8,867.0      427,534.0
   Q3   85,171.0   1,188.0   143,734.0   3,137.0   235,664.0   5,566.0      464,569.0   9,891.0      474,460.0
   Q4   95,791.0   1,383.0   166,667.0   4,705.0   256,920.0   5,777.0      519,378.0   11,865.0      531,243.0
1987   Q1   106,068.0   1,605.0   180,602.0   5,693.0   274,710.0   6,406.0      561,380.0   13,704.0      575,084.0
   Q2   119,617.0   1,653.0   194,238.0   6,046.0   286,091.0   7,155.0      599,946.0   14,854.0      614,800.0
   Q3   128,770.0   1,770.0   202,308.0   6,564.0   300,815.0   7,524.0      631,893.0   15,858.0      647,751.0
   Q4   137,988.0   1,972.0   205,977.0   6,657.0   309,806.0   7,749.0      653,771.0   16,378.0      670,149.0
1988   Q1   142,330.0   2,912.0   208,138.0   6,586.0   310,473.0   8,230.0      660,941.0   17,728.0      678,669.0
   Q2   153,253.0   4,185.0   209,702.0   6,453.0   314,728.0   7,888.0      677,683.0   18,526.0      696,209.0
   Q3   162,228.0   4,942.0   214,195.0   6,489.0   324,573.0   8,604.0      700,996.0   20,035.0      721,031.0
   Q4   172,331.0   5,919.0   219,988.0   6,418.0   331,257.0   9,270.0      723,576.0   21,607.0      745,183.0
1989   Q1   181,352.0   6,719.0   228,389.0   6,306.0   337,563.0   11,059.0      747,304.0   24,084.0      771,388.0
   Q2   188,774.0   7,727.0   238,446.0   6,796.0   342,545.0   11,214.0      769,765.0   25,737.0      795,502.0
   Q3   200,302.0   8,592.0   251,232.0   6,706.0   349,838.0   10,259.0      801,372.0   25,557.0      826,929.0
   Q4   219,577.0   8,655.0   266,060.0   6,810.0   358,142.0   10,225.0      843,779.0   25,690.0      869,469.0
1990   Q1   237,916.0   8,475.0   274,084.0   7,652.0   366,300.0   10,662.0      878,300.0   26,789.0      905,089.0
   Q2   254,811.0   8,519.0   287,232.0   8,108.0   374,960.0   10,496.0      917,003.0   27,123.0      944,126.0
   Q3   273,335.0   8,471.0   293,721.0   8,077.0   384,474.0   10,385.0      951,530.0   26,933.0      978,463.0
   Q4   291,194.0   8,639.0   308,369.0   7,990.0   391,505.0   12,108.0      991,068.0   28,737.0      1,019,805.0
1991   Q1   303,554.0   8,547.0   319,978.0   8,237.0   397,531.0   12,298.0      1,021,063.0   29,082.0      1,050,145.0
   Q2   322,444.0   8,645.0   332,624.0   8,509.0   403,679.0   12,403.0      1,058,747.0   29,557.0      1,088,304.0
   Q3   343,430.0   8,487.0   341,183.0   7,600.0   412,715.0   9,785.0      1,097,328.0   25,872.0      1,123,200.0
   Q4   362,667.0   9,317.0   351,906.0   7,257.0   415,767.0   9,528.0      1,130,340.0   26,102.0      1,156,442.0
1992   Q1   380,617.0   9,236.0   360,887.0   6,991.0   412,574.0   9,404.0      1,154,078.0   25,631.0      1,179,709.0
   Q2   403,940.0   9,286.0   376,177.0   6,620.0   413,828.0   9,094.0      1,193,945.0   25,000.0      1,218,945.0
   Q3   420,835.0   9,100.0   385,400.0   6,362.0   413,063.0   9,192.0      1,219,298.0   24,654.0      1,243,952.0
   Q4   435,979.0   9,000.0   401,525.0   5,989.0   410,675.0   8,841.0      1,248,179.0   23,830.0      1,272,009.0
1993   Q1   448,483.0   8,833.0   415,279.0   5,654.0   412,798.0   8,716.0      1,276,560.0   23,203.0      1,299,763.0
   Q2   456,645.0   8,575.0   417,646.0   5,236.0   404,425.0   8,741.0      1,278,716.0   22,552.0      1,301,268.0
   Q3   473,599.0   8,281.0   428,155.0   4,935.0   405,963.0   9,113.0      1,307,717.0   22,329.0      1,330,046.0
   Q4   486,804.0   8,721.0   442,612.0   4,535.0   404,864.0   9,202.0      1,334,280.0   22,458.0      1,356,738.0
1994   Q1   498,489.0   8,887.0   462,779.0   4,170.0   414,194.0   9,251.0      1,375,462.0   22,308.0      1,397,770.0
   Q2   505,730.0   9,125.0   475,733.0   3,822.0   426,363.0   9,346.0      1,407,826.0   22,293.0      1,430,119.0
   Q3   514,375.0   9,137.0   479,539.0   3,448.0   435,511.0   9,465.0      1,429,425.0   22,050.0      1,451,475.0
   Q4   520,763.0   9,580.0   487,725.0   3,126.0   441,198.0   9,736.0      1,449,686.0   22,442.0      1,472,128.0
1995   Q1   523,903.0   9,459.0   489,114.0   3,080.0   444,642.0   9,769.0      1,457,659.0   22,308.0      1,479,967.0
   Q2   533,091.0   10,578.0   495,182.0   3,034.0   446,862.0   10,246.0      1,475,135.0   23,858.0      1,498,993.0
   Q3   548,400.0   11,185.0   500,417.0   2,953.0   453,114.0   10,540.0      1,501,931.0   24,678.0      1,526,609.0
   Q4   569,724.0   13,235.0   512,238.0   2,813.0   461,438.0   10,845.0      1,543,400.0   26,893.0      1,570,293.0
1996   Q1   585,527.0   14,019.0   521,722.0   2,605.0   464,650.0   11,179.0      1,571,899.0   27,803.0      1,599,702.0
   Q2   606,271.0   15,014.0   534,238.0   2,433.0   473,825.0   11,491.0      1,614,334.0   28,938.0      1,643,272.0
   Q3   619,869.0   16,493.0   543,341.0   2,267.0   485,073.0   11,945.0      1,648,283.0   30,705.0      1,678,988.0
   Q4   633,209.0   17,570.0   551,513.0   2,747.0   494,064.0   12,182.0      1,678,786.0   32,499.0      1,711,285.0
1997   Q1   645,324.0   18,344.0   560,369.0   2,525.0   500,591.0   12,880.0      1,706,284.0   33,749.0      1,740,033.0
   Q2   654,826.0   19,105.0   564,445.0   2,742.0   507,618.0   13,320.0      1,726,889.0   35,167.0      1,762,056.0
   Q3   670,677.0   20,242.0   567,340.0   2,580.0   516,217.0   3,650.0      1,754,234.0   26,472.0      1,780,706.0
   Q4   687,981.0   21,601.0   576,846.0   2,539.0   523,225.0   13,654.0      1,788,052.0   37,794.0      1,825,846.0
1998   Q1   708,125.0   22,707.0   580,715.0   2,429.0   519,152.0   13,859.0      1,807,992.0   38,995.0      1,846,987.0
   Q2   737,631.0   23,728.0   607,469.0   2,322.0   523,400.0   14,343.0      1,868,500.0   40,393.0      1,908,893.0
   Q3   770,979.0   27,481.0   633,124.0   2,602.0   527,043.0   14,497.0      1,931,146.0   44,580.0      1,975,726.0
   Q4   804,204.0   30,313.0   643,465.0   2,994.0   522,498.0   14,948.0      1,970,167.0   48,255.0      2,018,422.0
1999   Q1   849,513.0   32,302.0   684,240.0   2,939.0   527,886.0   15,395.0      2,061,639.0   50,636.0      2,112,275.0
   Q2   877,863.0   33,572.0   714,844.0   3,241.0   537,287.0   15,909.0      2,129,994.0   52,722.0      2,182,716.0
   Q3   903,531.0   34,953.0   735,088.0   3,493.0   552,670.0   16,368.0      2,191,289.0   54,814.0      2,246,103.0
   Q4   924,941.0   35,942.0   744,619.0   35,942.0   565,189.0   17,074.0      2,234,749.0   88,958.0      2,323,707.0
2000   Q1   932,178.0   43,637.0   752,607.0   4,499.0   571,506.0   17,686.0      2,256,291.0   65,822.0      2,322,113.0
   Q2   957,584.0   38,231.0   763,890.0   4,751.0   572,661.0   18,047.0      2,294,135.0   61,029.0      2,355,164.0
   Q3   981,206.0   39,622.0   786,007.0   4,884.0   584,152.0   18,476.0      2,351,365.0   62,982.0      2,414,347.0
   Q4   1,016,398.0   41,352.0   816,602.0   41,352.0   592,624.0   18,929.0      2,425,624.0   101,633.0      2,527,257.0
2001   Q1   1,016,398.0   41,352.0   816,602.0   5,708.0   592,624.0   18,929.0      2,425,624.0   65,989.0      2,491,613.0
   Q2   1,116,534.0   47,444.0   867,924.0   5,826.0   577,228.0   20,792.0      2,561,686.0   74,062.0      2,635,748.0
   Q3   1,177,995.0   50,136.0   921,709.0   5,781.0   581,796.0   21,391.0      2,681,500.0   77,308.0      2,758,808.0
   Q4   1,238,125.0   52,226.0   940,933.0   52,226.0   569,460.0   21,908.0      2,748,518.0   126,360.0      2,874,878.0
2002   Q1   1,301,374.0   54,030.0   1,005,136.0   7,342.0   564,108.0   23,096.0      2,870,618.0   84,468.0      2,955,086.0
   Q2   1,349,442.0   55,152.0   1,045,981.0   55,152.0   559,549.0   24,196.0      2,954,972.0   134,500.0      3,089,472.0
   Q3   1,402,929.0   56,016.0   1,050,899.0   56,016.0   542,208.0   25,178.0      2,996,036.0   137,210.0      3,133,246.0
   Q4   1,478,610.0   59,677.0   1,072,990.0   59,677.0   512,098.0   25,790.0      3,063,698.0   145,144.0      3,208,842.0
2003   Q1   1,576,495.0   60,979.0   1,064,114.0   60,979.0   489,063.0   26,759.0      3,129,672.0   148,717.0      3,278,389.0
   Q2   1,687,263.0   62,633.0   1,042,417.0   62,633.0   460,430.0   27,499.0      3,190,110.0   152,765.0      3,342,875.0
   Q3   1,733,853.0   67,675.0   1,082,144.0   13,729.0   444,799.0   28,100.0      3,260,796.0   109,504.0      3,370,300.0
   Q4   1,780,884.0   76,161.0   1,141,241.0   16,098.0   444,820.0   28,918.0      3,366,945.0   121,177.0      3,488,122.0
2004   Q1   1,802,301.0   75,729.0   1,150,632.0   16,230.0   438,300.0   26,007.0      3,391,233.0   117,966.0      3,509,199.0
   Q2   1,803,584.0   75,425.0   1,168,494.0   16,482.0   427,943.0   30,581.0      3,400,021.0   122,488.0      3,522,509.0
   Q3   1,816,973.0   75,707.0   1,180,757.0   16,655.0   421,364.0   31,191.0      3,419,094.0   123,553.0      3,542,647.0
   Q4   1,673,339.0   69,722.0   1,173,847.0   15,546.0   409,089.0   32,147.0      3,256,275.0   117,415.0      3,373,690.0
2005   Q1   1,820,163.0   75,840.0   1,202,023.0   16,955.0   398,619.0   32,574.0      3,420,805.0   125,369.0      3,546,174.0
   Q2   1,824,143.0   76,006.0   1,228,600.0   17,330.0   388,057.0   32,858.0      3,440,800.0   126,194.0      3,566,994.0
   Q3   1,847,818.0   76,992.0   1,261,865.0   17,799.0   378,109.0   33,229.0      3,487,792.0   128,020.0      3,615,812.0
   Q4   1,753,708.0   73,071.0   1,294,521.0   14,503.0   371,484.0   33,762.0      3,419,713.0   121,336.0      3,541,049.0
2006   Q1   1,893,881.0   78,912.0   1,356,020.0   19,128.0   368,757.0   34,413.0      3,618,658.0   132,453.0      3,751,111.0
   Q2   1,924,275.0   80,178.0   1,381,468.0   19,487.0   370,469.0   34,966.0      3,676,212.0   134,631.0      3,810,843.0
   Q3   1,961,316.0   81,721.0   1,416,544.0   19,981.0   373,981.0   35,497.0      3,751,841.0   137,199.0      3,889,040.0
   Q4   1,894,396.0   78,933.0   1,442,306.0   8,415.0   373,886.0   36,135.0      3,710,588.0   123,483.0      3,834,071.0
2007   Q1   1,943,357.0   80,973.0   1,506,246.0   8,788.0   376,802.0   36,157.0      3,826,405.0   125,918.0      3,952,323.0
   Q2   1,999,762.0   83,323.0   1,561,920.0   9,113.0   380,808.0   36,211.0      3,942,490.0   128,647.0      4,071,137.0
   Q3   2,081,261.0   86,719.0   1,633,753.0   9,532.0   390,856.0   36,398.0      4,105,870.0   132,649.0      4,238,519.0
   Q4   2,206,263.0   91,928.0   1,706,684.0   10,658.0   406,822.0   36,640.0      4,319,769.0   139,226.0      4,458,995.0
2008   Q1   2,278,908.0   94,955.0   1,751,647.0   10,939.0   424,708.0   36,772.0      4,455,263.0   142,666.0      4,597,929.0
   Q2   2,346,853.0   97,786.0   1,791,127.0   11,185.0   473,272.0   36,945.0      4,611,252.0   145,916.0      4,757,168.0
   Q3   2,400,500.0   100,021.0   1,801,666.0   11,251.0   539,508.0   37,253.0      4,741,674.0   148,525.0      4,890,199.0
   Q4   2,417,077.0   100,712.0   1,786,906.0   14,829.0   597,206.0   39,406.0      4,801,189.0   154,947.0      4,956,136.0
2009   Q1   2,446,466.0   101,936.0   1,794,426.0   14,891.0   639,540.0   39,931.0      4,880,432.0   156,758.0      5,037,190.0
   Q2   2,498,725.0   104,114.0   1,810,595.0   15,026.0   699,277.0   40,978.0      5,008,597.0   160,118.0      5,168,715.0
   Q3   2,527,329.0   105,305.0   1,821,403.0   15,115.0   784,254.0   41,763.0      5,132,986.0   162,183.0      5,295,169.0
   Q4   2,592,868.0   59,852.0   1,824,656.0   14,263.0   836,761.0   43,509.0      5,254,285.0   117,624.0      5,371,909.0
2010   Q1   2,633,403.0   58,900.0   1,785,646.0   20,328.0   888,051.0   44,916.0      5,400,508.0   124,144.0      5,524,651.0
   Q2   2,622,016.0   61,972.0   1,764,927.0   22,407.0   949,829.0   46,973.0      5,336,772.0   131,352.0      5,468,124.0
   Q3   2,608,289.0   64,919.0   1,740,573.0   23,123.0   996,463.0   49,716.0      5,345,325.0   137,758.0      5,483,083.0
   Q4   2,618,455.0   77,251.0   1,707,539.0   24,049.0   1,037,538.0   52,223.0      5,363,532.0   153,523.0      5,517,055.0
2011   Q1   2,587,552.0   83,145.0   1,683,155.0   26,759.0   1,081,753.0   53,844.0      5,352,460.0   163,748.0      5,516,208.0
   Q2   2,612,018.0   89,098.0   1,672,004.0   30,390.0   1,124,607.0   55,991.0      5,441,736.0   142,372.0      5,584,108.0
                                    
Note: Totals may not be exact matches to data due to consolidation of trust data and classification of certain securities.                                    
Source: Federal Reserve archives, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae; data                                     
39
Suntrust Mortgage Scandal / Re: Suntrust Mortgage Scandal
« Last post by citizensscience on March 10, 2018, 06:51:04 AM »
Are you concerned SunTrust may have "Double-Pledged" your home with the Federal Home Loan Bank and or elsewhere??

Politely email SunTrust Chief Risk Officer and former SunTrust Mortgage CEO, Mr. Jerome Lienhard and inquire.






SunTrust Scandal, Jerome Lienhard, SunTrust Bank
40
Suntrust Mortgage Scandal / Re: Suntrust Mortgage Scandal
« Last post by citizensscience on March 09, 2018, 01:13:09 PM »
SunTrust Scandal


SunTrust Bank on “Liquidity” and the Federal Reserve Discount Window…  Circa 2010...





SunTrust Bank, SunTrust Mortgage, SunTrust Scandal
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